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We investigated the racial content of perceivers’ mental images of different
socioeconomic categories. We selected participants who were either high or low in
prejudice toward the poor. These participants saw 400 pairs of visually noisy face
images. Depending on condition, participants chose the face that looked like a poor
person, a middle income person, or a rich person. We averaged the faces selected to
create composite images of each social class. A second group of participants rated the
stereotypical Blackness of these images. They also rated the face images on a variety
of psychological traits. Participants high in economic prejudice produced strongly classdifferentiated mental images. They imagined the poor to be Blacker than middle income
and wealthy people. They also imagined them to have less positive psychological
characteristics. Participants low in economic prejudice also possessed images of the
wealthy that were relatively White, but they represented poor and middle class people
in a less racially differentiated way. We discuss implications for understanding the
intersections of race and class in social perception.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent psychological research on social categorization has emphasized the intersecting and
overlapping nature of our representations of social groups (Cole, 2009; Ridgeway and KricheliKatz, 2013; Kang and Bodenhausen, 2015). From this perspective, the meaning attached to
particular category memberships can vary as a function of other social identities (e.g., gender
stereotypes may differ as a function of perceived race; Shields, 2008), and membership in a
particular social category may lead to the presumption of membership in other categories that
are assumed to covary with it (e.g., members of high-status occupational groups are often assumed
to be men; Glick et al., 1995). In the present research, we examine the connections between mental
representations of race and social class. Specifically, we examine the hypothesis that conceptions
of social class are racialized, with low economic status being associated with Black Americans and
high economic status being associated with White Americans.
As Sanchez and Garcia (2012) have noted, surprisingly little research has directly examined the
connections between race and class in the minds of social perceivers. Given that White individuals
constitute the majority group in the United States and thus make up the greatest percentage of
both poor and rich individuals (DeNavas-Walt and Proctor, 2015), one reasonable possibility is
that the racial content of all social class categories, including the poor, is White by default. This
view accords with the assertion of intersectionality theorists that when perceivers think about one
subordinated social category (e.g., the poor), they nevertheless assume default features on other
dimensions (e.g., White, male, heterosexual, etc.; Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach, 2008). However,
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We employed the method of reverse correlation (e.g., Todorov
et al., 2011) to examine the question of whether thinking
about different social classes involves assumptions about race.
The reverse correlation technique consists of two phases: an
image-generation phase and an image-rating phase, described
in more detail in the Section “Materials and Methods”. Past
research confirms that the reverse correlation procedure captures
psychologically meaningful patterns of mental representation
and can be sensitive to individual difference factors. For example,
Dotsch et al. (2008) found that representations of outgroup
faces (Moroccans for Dutch participants) were more criminallooking and less trustworthy for prejudiced participants, versus
less prejudiced participants. For this reason, we measured our
participants’ attitudes toward the poor (Stevenson and Medler,
1995) several weeks prior to their completion of the imagegeneration phase of the reverse correlation task. Notably, the
items in the questionnaire make no mention of race whatsoever.
We examined whether variations in the amount of contempt
expressed toward the poor on this explicit measure would
be related to the tendency to imbue social class with racial
content.

other research suggests that there may be a psychological
association between subordinated race and class identities.
Specifically, using an explicit group description task, Cox and
Devine (2015) found evidence that when people think of the
category “Black person” they tend to activate the concept of
being poor; however, they did not find evidence for the converse
pattern. That is, when people think of the category “poor person”
they do not generally activate the concept “Black.” Overall,
this suggests that mental representations of the poor may not
incorporate any inherent notion of Blackness.
Nevertheless, it seems premature to reject the possibility
that class is indeed racialized, given other research suggesting
connections between race and social class. For example, Fiske
et al. (2002) utilized judgments on the dimensions of competence
and warmth to characterize the fundamental content of the
stereotypes of different groups. Their results showed that when
people consider both ingroups and outgroups, the category
“Middle Class People” was located very close to the category
“Whites” in this two-dimensional space, while the categories of
“Blue-Collar People” and “Blacks” were close neighbors. Thus, the
core content of social class stereotypes overlaps substantially with
that of race stereotypes. In a quite different paradigm, Penner
and Saperstein (2008; Saperstein and Penner, 2012) showed that
when people experience changes in their socioeconomic status, it
changes their likelihood of being categorized as Black or White
by others and even by themselves. Specifically, factors such as
becoming unemployed resulted in an increased likelihood of
being categorized as Black, and this was true both for women and
men (Penner and Saperstein, 2013).
Most relevant to the hypothesis that social class is racialized is
a recent set of experiments by Brown-Iannuzzi et al. (2017). These
studies showed that perceivers’ mental representations of welfare
recipients were significantly Blacker than their representations
of non-welfare recipients. This finding comports with the
possibility that social class is indeed racialized in the minds
of social perceivers, but it also raises important questions that
require further exploration. First, “welfare recipients” can be
regarded as a subset of the broader category of “poor people,”
and it is not clear how interchangeable the two concepts
are. In particular, the term “welfare recipients” has come
to serve as a “racial dog-whistle” in American politics; that
is, it is a common strategy whereby communicators invoke
notions of race without explicitly mentioning it (e.g., Gilens,
1996; Haney-López, 2015). It is thus unclear whether a more
neutral term for the poor would evoke the same racialized
mental representations. Second, “non-welfare-recipients” is a
large and heterogeneous comparison category, and it would
be of interest to specifically examine whether there are racial
distinctions made between representations of middle class
and upper-class groups. In addition to addressing these open
questions, it seems likely that the tendency to racialize mental
representations of the poor is not uniform; rather, it likely
varies as a function of social attitudes. In the present research,
we explored the possibility that people who hold the poor in
greater contempt are also likely to mentally represent the poor as
stereotypically Blacker than more economically advantaged social
classes.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
We report all measures, manipulations, and data exclusions.
The method involved two phases, one in which mental images
of different social classes were assessed, and one in which a
separate group of participants evaluated these images. Overall,
the study consists of a 3 (target social class: poor, middle class, and
rich) × 2 (economic prejudice of the image generators: low vs.
high) design. For the image generation phase, this is a betweensubjects design. For the image rating phase, this becomes a fully
within-subjects design.

Image Generation Phase
Participants
Prior experiments on visual representation of outgroup faces
by Dotsch et al. (2008) and Dotsch and Todorov (2012)
used between 15 and 35 participants for the image generation
phase; they repeatedly documented individual differences in
visual representations within these samples. We thus aimed
to collect 35 participants per each of our three social class
conditions, resulting in a final sample of 107 participants.
Participants were students in an introductory psychology class
who received course credit. They were on average 18.65 years
old (SD = 1.25) and 41% male. Most participants self-identified
as White (41%) or Asian (38%), with the rest identifying as
African American (8%), Latino (8%) or multiracial (4%). Their
average subjective self-rating of socioeconomic status (Adler
et al., 2000) was 6.79 (SD = 1.82) on a 10-point scale, with
higher scores indicating higher subjective socioeconomic status
(SES).

Procedure
Participants completed questionnaire items concerning their
explicit attitudes toward the economically disadvantaged
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the image-generation phase on 15 different trait dimensions.
The order of image presentation was randomized. The primary
dependent variable was stereotypical Blackness. We also
included skin tone as another measure of racial categorization.
Additionally, based on work examining the stereotype content
of poor individuals, we also assessed stereotypes such laziness,
motivation, and intelligence (Fiske et al., 2002), as well as
a question about how well-groomed participants thought the
depicted person looks. Next, based on work suggesting that lowSES individuals are dehumanized, we also assessed a group of
traits that have been considered to reflect the degree of perceived
humanity of social targets (e.g., curiosity and refinement; Haslam,
2006; Loughnan et al., 2014). Participants saw all six images
in a randomized order and were asked to provide their ratings
(1 = not at all, 6 = completely) on each of the trait dimensions.
Finally, participants were shown each of the six images again
in a new random order, and they were asked to categorize the
race of each image. Specifically, they were given a multiplechoice question that asked, “Does the person in this picture
look mostly: [Black, Asian, White, Latino, or Native American]?”
After completing these ratings, participants provided their own
demographic details and were then debriefed and paid.

(Stevenson and Medler, 1995) at a mass testing session 4–8 weeks
prior to their participation in the laboratory. This 9-item Likert
scale assesses agreement with negative statements about poor
people (e.g., “People who do not make much money are generally
unmotivated.”) and is scored such that higher scores indicate
more negativity toward the poor (α = 0.94). The response
scale ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Individuals were selected to participate in the study based on
their scores on this measure; based on the overall distribution of
scores, we chose participants who scored in the upper third of
responses (M = 3.05, SD = 0.50) for the high-prejudice group
and those who scored in the lower third of the distribution
(M = 1.29, SD = 0.28) for the low-prejudice group.
Participants reported to a laboratory for the main
experimental session. They were randomly assigned to one
of three conditions – to choose either the “poor,” “middle
income,” or “rich” person during the image generation task. Prior
to the lab sessions, a biracial base photo (Krosch and Amodio,
2014) was superimposed with sinusoidal noise patterns and
the inverse of the noise patterns (Dotsch and Todorov, 2012)
repeatedly in order to generate 400 pairs of face-images that
were presented to participants one pair at a time on a computer
screen in a private room. On each trial, they were simply asked
to choose which of the two pictures best matched the relevant
criterion (e.g., “which face looks poor?” in the poor condition);
notably, race was never mentioned during this image-generation
phase. Averaging all of the participant’s selections resulted in a
composite image of what the participant thought a poor, middle
income, or rich person looked like, depending on condition.
The composite images from each participant within a condition
were then averaged to generate an overall composite image for
that condition, separately for the participants low versus high
in economic prejudice, resulting in a total of six final composite
images.

RESULTS
Composite images for each of the six combinations of class
condition × economic prejudice level of the image generators are
shown in Figure 1.
A repeated-measures ANOVA examining ratings of stereotypical Blackness as a function of participants’ prejudice level (low
or high) and condition (poor, middle income, or rich) revealed
a significant main effect of SES category, F(2, 164) = 22.20,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.21, such that the poor composite (M = 2.97,
SD = 1.56) was rated as significantly more stereotypically Black
than either the middle income (M = 2.20, SD = 1.10) or rich
(M = 2.06, SD = 1.24) composite, both ps < 0.001, with no
difference between the latter two composites, p = 0.55. Results
also revealed a significant main effect of the economic prejudice
level of the participants generating the image, F(1,82) = 4.63,
p = 0.009, η2p = 0.08, such that the composites generated by the
relatively more prejudiced participants (M = 2.31, SD = 1.06)
were slightly less stereotypically Black than the composites
generated by participants who were less prejudiced (M = 2.51,
SD = 1.15; p = 0.009).
Notably, there was also a significant interaction between SES
category and level of economic prejudice of the participants
generating the composite image, F(2,164) = 12.21, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.13. Among the composites generated by relatively
more prejudiced participants, the poor composite (M = 3.11,
SD = 1.71) was rated as significantly more stereotypically
Black than either the middle income composite (M = 1.86,
SD = 1.17; p < 0.001) or the rich composite (M = 1.98,
SD = 1.30; p < 0.001). Among the composites generated by the
relatively less prejudiced participants, there was no significant
difference in the stereotypic Blackness ratings for the poor
(M = 2.83, SD = 1.68) versus middle income (M = 2.54,

Image Rating Phase
Participants
During the image rating phase, a new set of participants recruited
from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk were asked to rate all of
the composite images generated by the lab participants. These
participants were naïve to the conditions under which the
composite images were created. They received $1 in return for
completing a brief online survey. We sought a sample of N = 90
to provide adequate power (1-β > 0.80) to detect a mediumsized effect (r = 0.30; G∗ Power software, Faul et al., 2009). Three
participants were excluded due to excessive missing data, one did
not provide affirmative consent, and two indicated that they were
not careful while taking the survey in a quality check included
at the very end of the study. The final sample consisted of 84
participants. The sample was 54% female, mostly White (71%),
had a mean age of 32.71 (SD = 10.53), and a mean subjective
self-rating of SES of 5.26 (SD = 1.78).

Procedure
Participants were told that the researchers were interested in
seeing how well they could discern information from blurry
photos. They were asked to rate the six images created during
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FIGURE 1 | Composite images generated by participants. The top row shows the composite images selected by the relatively more economically prejudiced
participants as representing poor (1a), middle income (1b), or rich (1c) faces. The bottom row shows the composite images of relatively less prejudiced participants
for the corresponding social classes.

SD = 1.37; p = 0.33) composites; however, both were rated as
more stereotypically Black than the rich composite (M = 2.15,
SD = 1.38), ps = 0.002 and 0.025, respectively. Examined
differently, high-prejudice participants generated a composite
image of the poor that was directionally higher in Blackness
than did their low-prejudice counterparts, but the difference
did not reach statistical significance, Mdiff = 0.277, p = 0.057.
There was no difference in the rated Blackness of the images of
the rich as a function of economic prejudice, Mdiff = –0.169,
p = 0.145. However, for the middle income composite, lowprejudice participants generated an image that was rated as more
stereotypically Black than the one generated by more prejudiced
participants (Mdiff = 0.687, p < 0.001).
For the racial categorization task, we first created a
dichotomous variable reflecting whether or not the image raters
classified a given composite image as Black. The proportions
of “Black” classifications are shown in Figure 2 as a function
of the target’s social class and the economic prejudice level of
the image generators. Results paralleled the stereotypic Blackness
trait ratings. We analyzed this index using a logit mixed-model
approach, given the dichotomous nature of this variable (e.g.,
Jaeger, 2008). This analysis confirmed a significant effect of target
group, F(2,496) = 35.51, p < 0.001, such that poor images
were most likely to be categorized as Black, rich images were
least likely to be categorized as Black, and middle class images
fell in between. This main effect was qualified by a significant
interaction with the prejudice level of the image generators,
F(2,496) = 18.02, p < 0.001. Decomposing this interaction, we
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FIGURE 2 | Black classifications of composite images. Mean proportions
(and 95% confidence intervals) of categorizing the facial image as Black.

see that although the rich images were equally unlikely to be
seen as Black regardless of prejudice level, p = 0.81, prejudice
level did influence the likelihood that poor and middle class
images looked Black. Specifically, the poor images of highprejudice people were significantly more likely to be categorized
as Black than those of low-prejudice people, and the middle
class images of high-prejudice people were significantly less likely
to be categorized as Black than those of low-prejudice people,
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ps < 0.001. Examined differently, the high-prejudice image
generators produced substantially more Black-looking images
of the poor than of the middle class or rich, ps < 0.001, but
their images of the middle class and rich were equally un-Blacklooking, p = 0.49. Low-prejudice image generators, in contrast,
produced images of the poor that were only somewhat more
Black-looking than their images of the middle class (p = 0.045),
but their mental image of the middle class was substantially more
Black-looking than their image of the rich (p < 0.001). In other
words, low-prejudice individuals imputed relatively similar levels
of Blackness to the poor and middle class, whereas high-prejudice
individuals imputed much more Blackness to the poor than to the
middle class.
To assess the extent of dehumanization in mental
representations of social class, we collected ratings of 8 traits
that are associated with “humanness” (see Haslam, 2006; Bastian
and Haslam, 2010): unrefined (R), rational, cultured, polite,
disorganized (R), impulsive (R), irresponsible (R), and curious,
with higher scores reflecting greater perceived humanness. The

scale exhibited acceptable reliability (average α = 0.69). Results
are depicted in Figure 3. As the figure indicates, there was
a main effect of social class condition, F(2,133.42)1 = 60.04,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.42, which was further qualified by a significant
interaction of social class condition and economic prejudice,
F(2,151.89) = 9.93, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.11. Images generated
by participants with higher levels of economic prejudice were
seen by naïve raters as possessing greater humanity as SES
increased; they represented middle income people as having
greater humanity than poor people, and rich people as having
greater humanity than middle income people (ps < 0.001).
Images of the middle class generated by participants with lower
levels of economic prejudice were also seen by naïve raters as
possessing greater humanity than poor people (p < 0.001), but
there was no difference in the humanness of the middle class and
rich images (p = 0.56). Examined differently, poor people were
represented as similar in their humanity by those high vs. low in
economic prejudice (p = 0.83), but high-prejudiced individuals
represented middle income people as less human (p = 0.008) and
rich people as more human (p = 0.001) than did low-prejudice
individuals.
Remaining results are summarized in Table 1. In general, the
ratings indicate that all individuals represent the social classes in
psychologically differentiated ways, although the differentiation
is generally stronger among those who are higher in economic
prejudice. Overall, participants visualized poor people as less
friendly, less intelligent, lazier, less motivated, and less wellgroomed than wealthier people.

DISCUSSION
These results support the hypothesis that social class is
racialized. Among relatively more class-prejudiced participants,
the representation of a poor person was Blacker than the
representations generated for the middle income or rich
composites. While the poor composite was infused with greater
Blackness relative to the middle income and rich composites,
the composites representing the latter two classes were rated as
FIGURE 3 | Perceived humanity of composite images. Mean ratings (and
95% confidence intervals) of the humanness of the representations of the
social classes as a function of economic prejudice.

1

Mauchly’s test of sphericity was significant (indicating violation of sphericity), so
we used the Greenhouse–Geisser adjustment for all analyses.

TABLE 1 | Means for ratings of composite images as a function of targeted social class and economic prejudice level; inferential statistics for the social
class × economic prejudice interaction are presented in the right columns.
Measure

Lower economic prejudice
Poor

Higher economic prejudice

Interaction

middle income

Rich

Poor

middle income

Rich

F

p

Dark-Skinned

3.57a

3.30a

2.75b

3.69a

2.57b

2.62b

6.81

0.001

Friendly

2.31a

3.55b

4.01c

2.38a

3.33b

4.62c

8.70

0.001

Intelligent

2.86a

3.31b

3.65c

2.76a

3.23b

4.03c

4.97

0.008

Lazy

3.33a

2.47b

2.47b

3.14a

2.78ab

2.41b

3.46

0.034

Motivated

2.52a

3.26b

3.64c

2.61a

3.08b

3.98c

4.52

0.012

Weil-groomed

2.24a

3.80b

4.11c

1.95a

3.03b

4.68c

25.62

0.001

Within prejudice level, means with different superscripts are significantly different from one another, p < 0.01.
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similarly White. In contrast, images of the poor and middle class
generated by less class-prejudiced participants were relatively
less racially differentiated, although like their high-prejudice
counterparts, they also represented the wealthy in White-looking
ways.
These findings expand on the earlier research of BrownIannuzzi et al. (2017) in some noteworthy ways. They show that
racialized representations of the poor can be found even in the
absence of racial dog-whistle terms such as “welfare recipients,”
they confirm that wealthy people are imagined to look White, and
they show that the racial content of mental images of the poor and
the middle class vary depending on level of economic prejudice.
In this latter regard, the findings confirm that economic prejudice
can moderate the racialization of social class.
These facial representations also carried noteworthy
psychological connotations. The poor composite generated by
the relatively more prejudiced participants was perceived as less
likely to possess positive traits (e.g., uniquely human qualities)
and more likely to possess negative traits (e.g., laziness). In
addition, assessments of the humanity of the facial composites
provided evidence that there are some respects in which the
wealthy are represented in psychologically more favorable ways
than the middle class. That these results emerged differentially
for relatively more prejudiced versus relatively less prejudiced
participants is also consistent with work by other researchers
that find attitudes can influence the representations of category
prototypes or exemplars that come to mind (Dotsch et al., 2008;
Young et al., 2014).
This study indicates that social class connotes race, such that
the category “poor people” is mentally represented as relatively
Black, even though there are many more poor White than poor
Black people in the US. People also imagine the poor to be lower
in distinctly human traits, less friendly, less intelligent, and in
general as less psychologically fit than middle income or rich
groups. The tendency we observed for people to imbue social
class representations with racial content stands in contrast to
the recent findings of Cox and Devine (2015), who found that
people do not spontaneously think of Black as being associated
with the concept “poor person.” Of course, there is a major
difference in the methodology involved in the two studies.
The research of Cox and Devine examined participants’ explicit
statements about the characteristics of “poor people,” whereas
our method involved no explicit statements at all. It may be
that people are reluctant to explicitly state that poor people are
Black, or they may not explicitly realize the extent to which
blackness is a feature of their mental representation of the
poor.

Our results comport with the notion that resentments
regarding policies designed to help the poor are tied up with racial
prejudice (e.g., Gilens, 1996). People who view the poor as lazy
and parasitical tend to mentally represent the category “poor” as
blacker and the category “rich” as whiter, compared to the people
who are low in contempt for the poor. In addition to the racism
that underlies the disinclination to help the (presumptively
Black) poor, Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz (2013) argued that poor
Whites are also put in a bind by virtue of not being prototypically
of the poor category. McDermott (2010) reports fascinating
evidence of poor Appalachian Whites who choose to identify as
“Black” (based on uncertain, distant minority ancestry) in order
to avoid the shame of being poor Whites.
One major limitation of the current work is that we had a
primarily White and Asian sample. Both of these racial groups
are higher status groups in society (cf. Fiske et al., 2002), and thus
may share similar mental representations of SES categories. In
contrast, lower-status groups may have different representations
of SES, because they are trying to increase their group’s position
in the social hierarchy. Further research is needed to better
understand this potential divergence among high versus low
status individuals.
Overall, our results confirm that class is racialized. Those who
express more negative attitudes toward the poor have clearer
racial delineations depending on SES category, compared to
those who express more generous attitudes toward the poor.
One interesting direction for future research will be to examine
the effects of situational manipulations relating to the perceived
causes of poverty and the nonracial characteristics of poor people
on the racial content of mental representations of social class.

REFERENCES

Brown-Iannuzzi, J. L., Dotsch, R., Cooley, E., and Payne, B. K. (2017).
The relationship between mental representations of welfare recipients and
attitudes toward welfare. Psychol. Sci. 28, 92–103. doi: 10.1177/0956797616
674999
Cole, E. R. (2009). Intersectionality and research in psychology. Am. Psychol. 64,
170–180. doi: 10.1037/a0014564
Cox, W. T., and Devine, P. G. (2015). Stereotypes possess heterogeneous
directionality: a theoretical and empirical exploration of stereotype structure
and content. PLoS ONE 10:e0122292. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0122292

ETHICS STATEMENT
This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at
Northwestern University with written informed consent from
all subjects. All subjects gave written informed consent in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. The protocol was
approved by the Northwestern IRB.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
Conceived and designed the experiment: RL and GB. Performed
the experiment: RL. Analyzed the data: RL and GB. Wrote the
paper: RL and GB.

Adler, N. E., Epel, E. S., Castellazzo, G., and Ickovics, J. R. (2000). Relationship
of subjective and objective social status with psychological and physiological
functioning: Preliminary data in healthy, White women. Health Psychol. 19,
586–592. doi: 10.1037/0278-6133.19.6.586
Bastian, B., and Haslam, N. (2010). Excluded from humanity: the dehumanizing
effects of social ostracism. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 46, 107–113. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.
2009.06.022

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

6

April 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 519

Lei and Bodenhausen

Race and Social Class

DeNavas-Walt, C., and Proctor, B. D. (2015). Income and Poverty in the United
States: 2014. Washington, DC: United States Census Bureau.
Dotsch, R., and Todorov, A. (2012). Reverse correlating social face perception. Soc.
Psychol. Pers. Sci. 3, 562–571. doi: 10.1177/1948550611430272
Dotsch, R., Wigboldus, D. H. J., Langner, O., and van Knippenberg, A. (2008).
Ethnic out-group faces are biased in the prejudiced mind. Psychol. Sci. 19,
978–980. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02186.x
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Buchner, A., and Lang, A. G. (2009). Statistical power
analyses using G∗ Power 3.1: tests for correlation and regression analyses.
Behav. Res. Methods 41, 1149–1160. doi: 10.3758/BRM.41.4.1149
Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J., Glick, P., and Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed)
stereotype content: competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived
status and competition. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 82, 878–902. doi: 10.1037/00223514.82.6.878
Gilens, M. (1996). “Race coding” and white opposition to welfare. Am. Polit. Sci.
Rev. 90, 593–604. doi: 10.2307/2082611
Glick, P., Wilk, K., and Perreault, M. (1995). Images of occupations: components
of gender and status in occupational stereotypes. Sex Roles 32, 565–582.
doi: 10.1007/BF01544212
Haney-López, I. (2015). Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals Have
Reinvented Racism and Wrecked the Middle Class. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
Haslam, N. (2006). Dehumanization: an integrative review. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Rev.
10, 252–264. doi: 10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_4
Jaeger, T. F. (2008). Categorical data analysis: away from ANOVAs (transformation
or not) and towards logit mixed models. J. Mem. Lang. 59, 434–446.
doi: 10.1016/j.jml.2007.11.007
Kang, S. K., and Bodenhausen, G. V. (2015). Multiple identities in social perception
and interaction: challenges and opportunities. Ann. Rev. Psychol. 66, 547–574.
doi: 10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-015025
Krosch, A. R., and Amodio, D. M. (2014). Economic scarcity alters the perception
of race. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 111, 9079–9084. doi: 10.1073/pnas.
1404448111
Loughnan, S., Haslam, N., Sutton, R. M., and Spencer, B. (2014). Dehumanization
and social class: animality in the stereotypes of White trash, chavs, and bogans.
Soc. Psychol. 45, 54–61. doi: 10.1027/1864-9335/a000159
McDermott, M. (2010). “Ways of being White,” in Doing Race: 21 Essays for the 21st
Century, eds H. Markus and P. Moya (New York, NY: Norton), 415–438.

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

Penner, A. M., and Saperstein, A. (2008). How social status shapes race. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 105, 19628–19630. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0805762105
Penner, A. M., and Saperstein, A. (2013). Engendering racial perceptions: an
intersectional analysis of how social status shapes race. Gender Soc. 27, 319–344.
doi: 10.1177/0891243213480262
Purdie-Vaughns, V., and Eibach, R. P. (2008). Intersectional invisibility: the
distinctive advantages and disadvantages of multiple subordinate-group
identities. Sex Roles 59, 377–391. doi: 10.1007/s11199-008-9424-4
Ridgeway, C. L., and Kricheli-Katz, T. (2013). Intersecting cultural beliefs in social
relations: Gender, race, and class binds and freedoms. Gender Soc. 27, 294–318.
doi: 10.1177/0891243213479445
Sanchez, D. T., and Garcia, J. A. (2012). “Putting race in context: socioeconomic
status predicts racial fluidity,” in Facing Social Class: How Societal Rank
Influences Interaction, eds S. T. Fiske and H. R. Markus (New York, NY: Russell
Sage Foundation), 216–233.
Saperstein, A., and Penner, A. M. (2012). Racial fluidity and inequality in the
United States. Am. J. Sociol. 118, 676–727. doi: 10.1086/667722
Shields, S. A. (2008). Gender: an intersectionality perspective. Sex Roles 59,
301–311. doi: 10.1007/s11199-008-9501-8
Stevenson, M. R., and Medler, B. R. (1995). Is homophobia a weapon of sexism?
J. Mens Stud. 4, 1–8. doi: 10.1177/106082659500400101
Todorov, A., Dotsch, R., Wigboldus, D. H., and Said, C. P. (2011). Data-driven
methods for modeling social perception. Soc. Pers. Psychol. Compass 5, 775–791.
doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2011.00389.x
Young, A. I., Ratner, K. G., and Fazio, R. H. (2014). Political attitudes bias
the mental representation of a presidential candidate’s face. Psychol. Sci. 25,
503–510. doi: 10.1177/0956797613510717
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2017 Lei and Bodenhausen. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal
is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

7

April 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 519

